When silence is golden: The use of strategic silence in crisis management by LE, Phuong D. et al.
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of
Business Lee Kong Chian School of Business
1-2019
When silence is golden: The use of strategic silence
in crisis management
Phuong D. LE
Nanyang Technological University
Hui Xun TEO
Nanyang Technological University
Augustine PANG
Singapore Management University, augustine@smu.edu.sg
Yuling LI
Nanyang Technological University
Cai-Qin GOH
Nanyang Technological University
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1108/CCIJ-10-2018-0108
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research
Part of the Business and Corporate Communications Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Lee Kong Chian School of Business at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business by an authorized administrator
of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
LE, Phuong D.; TEO, Hui Xun; PANG, Augustine; LI, Yuling; and GOH, Cai-Qin. When silence is golden: The use of strategic silence
in crisis management. (2019). Corporate Communications: An International Journal. 24, (1), 162-178. Research Collection Lee Kong
Chian School Of Business.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/6039
When is silence golden?
The use of strategic silence in
crisis communication
Phuong D. Le and Hui Xun Teo
Wee Kim Wee School of Communication and Information,
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
Augustine Pang
Lee Kong Chian School of Business,
Singapore Management University, Singapore, and
Yuling Li and Cai-Qin Goh
Wee Kim Wee School of Communication and Information,
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
Abstract
Purpose – Scholars have discouraged using silence in crises as it magnifies the information vacuum
(see Pang, 2013). The purpose of this paper is to argue for its viability and explore the type of silence that
can be used.
Design/methodology/approach – Eight international cases were analyzed to examine how silence was
adopted, sustained and broken.
Findings – The findings uncovered three intention-based typologies of strategic silence: delaying, avoiding
and hiding silences. Among such, avoiding/hiding silence intensified crises and adversely affected post-
silence organizational image when forcefully broken, while delaying silence helped preserve/restore image
with primary stakeholders if successfully sustained and broken as planned.
Research limitations/implications – First, these findings may lack generalizability due to the limited
number of cases studied. Second, local sentiments may not be fully represented in the English-language news
examined as they may be written for a different audience. Finally, a number of cases studied were still
ongoing at the time of writing, so the overall effectiveness of the strategy employed might be compromised as
future events unfold.
Practical implications – A stage-based practical guide to adopting delaying silence is proposed as a
supporting strategy before the execution of crisis response strategies.
Originality/value – This is one of the few studies to examine the role of silence in crisis communication as
silence is not recognized as a type of response in dominant crisis theories – be it the situational crisis
communication theory or the image repair theory (An and Cheng, 2010; Benoit, 2015; Benoit and Pang, 2008;
Xu and Li, 2013).
Keywords Media, Leadership, Corporate communications, Crisis, Crisis management
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
When crises occur, people demand answers. Stakeholders seek them in the media, which in
turn fuels the demand for information, generating an information vacuum (Pang, 2013).
Scholars underscore the need for organizations to actively communicate and fill the
information vacuum, failing which the space may be filled with speculation and
misinformation and cause the crisis to escalate (Pang, 2013). As such, the common
assumption is that a crisis response is necessary and desirable, and that organizations
should not stay silent during a crisis. However, in reality, organizations sometimes opt to
stay quiet during a crisis (Claeys and Opgenhaffen, 2016). There is thus a theoretical gap to
be addressed, since little has been studied on silence and the effectiveness of silence as a
crisis management strategy.
The present investigation aims to address this gap by examining eight international
crises where silence was strategically adopted by organizations and whether the strategy
worked. Theoretically, this study presents new perspectives that support the strategic use
of silence in managing crises and explores a systematic approach in categorizing its uses.
Managerially, it provides practical guidance on when and how to strategically adopt and
break silence during a crisis.
Literature review
Defining strategic silence
Silence – defined as “a lack of communication from an organization or its failure to provide
clear and adequate responses to questions or concerns raised” (Woon and Pang, 2017, p. 335) –
can be used intentionally or unintentionally. For the purpose of this paper, a clear distinction
between intentional and unintentional silence must be made. Penuel et al. (2013) termed
unintentional silence as “natural silence”; Woon and Pang (2017) further identified it as
stemming from unfavorable situations that prevent an organization from quickly acquiring
and disseminating critical information to stakeholders. In essence, natural silence occurs when
the organization has no other choice but to remain silent. By contrast, strategic silence – the
focus of this study – is a deliberate decision.
In political discourse, Brummett (1980) defined strategic silence as a public figure’s
intentional refusal to communicate verbally, violating expectations, with the public
assigning predictable meanings to it, while Dimitrov (2015) referred to strategic silence not
only as the absence of speech but also as statements providing little to no information.
Strategic silence should then be operationally defined as a deliberate lack of organizational
communication, and if there is any, the information is intentionally scant and ambiguous.
Silence viewed as undesirable
During a crisis, stakeholders demand answers, and when they are met with silence, an
information vacuum is birthed, which may escalate or reawaken in an enlarged second crisis,
resulting in speculation, frustration and loss of trust among stakeholders (Woon and Pang,
2017). As such, scholars have recommended that organizations employ proactive crisis
management strategies like “stealing thunder” (Coombs, 2015a, p. 146) to break news
about the crisis before the media does to reduce reputational damage (Claeys and Cauberghe,
2012; Woon and Pang, 2017). In handling challenges, organizations may adopt
strategic silence as its “refusal strategy” to ignore the challenger, but Coombs and
Holladay (2015) highlighted this as risky because it allows the challenger to frame the
situation. In journalistic discourse, silence “often insinuates culpability and guilt by default”
(Dimitrov, 2015, p. 638); and in organizations, silence from management might be interpreted
as “negligence, indifference, an index of a weak position, or a validation of rumors”
( Johannesen, 1974, p. 30). Hearit (1994) highlighted the benefits of issuing an apologia early in
a corporate crisis to deprive the media of a continuing story and restrain reputational
damages, critiquing silence as “an admission of guilt” (p. 114). Without an apology or denial
response, Ferrin et al. (2007) found the use of silence to be suboptimal in managing different
types of trust violations for it neither clarifies guilt nor offers redemption.
Due to its passive nature, silence is not recognized as a type of response in prominent
crisis response frameworks. The two dominant crisis theories – Coombs’ situational crisis
communication theory (SCCT) and Benoit’s image repair theory (IRT) (An and Cheng, 2010;
Benoit, 2015; Benoit and Pang, 2008; Xu and Li, 2013) – do not consider silence as a
strategy. SCCT argues that communicating information is the first priority, followed by the
adoption of response strategies. Similarly, IRT recommended proactive strategies in
managing an organization’s image during a crisis, and therefore excluded silence from the
list of response options.
Where strategic silence might work
Despite the fact that strategic silence in crisis has been practiced by organizations
worldwide, under federal investigations, religious ministries in the USA employed strategic
silence (Swanson, 2012); in a survey in Croatia, 16.3 percent of practitioners chose to remain
silent while facing a crisis ( Jugo, 2017); in Hong Kong, silence was found to be commonly
practiced by corporations during organizational crises (Lee, 2000, as cited in Lee, 2004).
It has been suggested that strategic silence can be viable, albeit circumstantially.
It might be practiced when there are legal implications to speaking out or when
information on hand is insufficient (Claeys and Opgenhaffen, 2016). Regulators might use
strategic silence to signal confidence in position when faced with criticism in areas where
they have a strong reputation (Maor et al., 2012). Politicians could use it to dodge
commitments or conflicts ( Johannesen, 1974, p. 32). Notably, Smith (2013) suggested
that strategic silence can be used to signal patience, composure with noble intentions
(e.g. sympathy or respect for privacy) or to avoid sidetracking while the issue is being
worked on. This strategy, however, only works when the organization is trusted by
stakeholders; no “no comment” statement, which often implies guilt, is made; and a
statement of justification is issued (Smith, 2013).
Dimitrov (2015) introduced four types of silences in public relations: absolute, defensive,
preserving and anticipating. Absolute silence was highlighted as a riskier option as it is
infinite and works best to avoid an overreaction in response to crises, which requires sound
judgment. The other three types involve some form of calculated response, serving to either
evade the real issue (defensive), cascade the information to a platform of lower visibility
(preserving) or to flag worst-case scenarios ahead of time (anticipating) (Dimitrov, 2015).
While the above treatments of strategic silence overlap in their focus on its intentionality,
organizational intentions behind the strategy are not spelled out and distinguished clearly.
The authors of this paper recognize the need for a more systematic approach that examines
such intentions and the corresponding strategies. As crisis literature on silence is limited,
research was drawn from the field of linguistics, which has studied the subject in greater depth.
Organizational intentions of strategic silence
Jensen (1973), a linguistics researcher, listed five interpersonal communication functions of
silence, which may apply in the positive or negative sense: linkage function – to bond people
or separate them; affecting function – to heal or hurt; revelation function – to reveal or hide
information from others; judgmental function – to signal assent/favor or dissent/disfavor;
and activating function – to signal deep thoughtfulness or mental inactivity. Extending this
theory to corporate communication, and specifically crisis communication, it is possible that
organizations/leaders may strategically use silence for similar functions. The authors
propose to transpose such into the corporate context (see Table I).
When evaluating Dimitrov’s (2015) four types of silence, an overlap appears in the five
functions listed above, with absolute silence reflecting the linkage function (in this instance,
avoiding), defensive and preserving silence indicating revelation (revealing and hiding,
respectively), and anticipating silence demonstrating activation (work-in-progress).
Silence function Organizational intention in crisis management
Linkage (+) Bond with stakeholders (−) Avoid stakeholders/issues
Affecting (+) Heal stakeholders (−) Wound stakeholders
Revelation (+) Reveal information (−) Hide information
Judgment (+) Signal approval (−) Signal disapproval
Activation (+) Signal work-in-progress (−) Signal inaction
Table I.
Proposed functions of
strategic silence in
crisis management
Factors leading to the adoption of strategic silence
Besides organizational intentions, other external factors, namely the crisis situation and the
local culture, might predispose an organization to adopt silence in managing a crisis.
Crisis situation factors. Even though not considered a response strategy in the SCCT
(Coombs, 2008), strategic silence is still used by organizations to manage crises. Such
adoption might then still be influenced by the same crisis situation factors identified in the
SCCT, namely, crisis type, crisis responsibility, crisis severity and the organization’s history
of dealing with similar crises (Coombs, 2008).
Cultural context. As most prominent crisis response strategy frameworks have been
developed in the west, they might not fully capture the influence of culture in analyzing
non-western crises (Hu and Pang, 2016). Depending on differing beliefs on how much/little
communication is needed in a given circumstance, different cultures can perceive silence
differently ( Jaworski, 1992). Specifically, Johannesen (1974) suggested that Asian cultures have
a greater tolerance for silence. For instance, in Japan, silence is socio-culturally acceptable and
widely perceived as meaningful (Fujio, 2004). Ye and Pang (2011) noted that Chinese cultural
concepts of “saving face” and “uncertainty avoidance” (p. 260) can shape crisis responses, and
these can manifest in the preference to avoid communication or divert attention (Hu and Pang,
2018). Pang (2013) also noted that the Chinese Government’s first strategy is often to cover up
the crisis until it fades away. Strategic silence may thus be more commonly adopted in such
Asian contexts. In other words, culture can be a predisposing factor in forming a crisis
management strategy as described in the contingency theory (Pang et al., 2010).
The first research question thus looks at the organizational intentions, crisis situation
and cultural context when it comes to the adoption of silence:
RQ1. Under what circumstances do organizations keep silent in crises?
Strategic silence as a crisis intensifier
The second research question examines what happens during the silence. Studies have
argued for the criticality of responding as quickly as possible during crisis. A quick
response helps the organization reassert organizational control and credibility (Augustine,
1995). A slow response, on the contrary, connotes incompetence (Donath, 1984). Woon and
Pang (2017) suggested that an organization’s silence during an information vacuum
“provokes a response intensified by public dissatisfaction and media glare” (p. 331). This
can be further escalated by media and social media hype, where issues gain traction in
both legacy and new media (Woon and Pang, 2017) through created and shared content.
Without a message framed by the organization, the silence would be open to interpretation
by their stakeholders. As stakeholders might have conflicting interests and dissension on
certain issues (Coombs and Holladay, 2015), the silence might also produce different, even
contrasting, effects on different stakeholders. It is therefore meaningful to examine
whether silence worsens the information vacuum in all cases, particularly in relation to
stakeholders’ perceptions of the organization:
RQ2. How does the organization’s silence intensify the crisis?
The breaking of strategic silence
An organization might plan to break silence at a certain time, or maintain it by remaining
silent until the crisis is over. In either instance, circumstances may arise which could affect
the organization’s plan.
Situational factors. During a crisis, new events might unfold or new information might
become available. Situational factors may cause an organization to change its position. The
contingency theory of strategic conflict management termed it as stance movement, and that
situational factors can be powerful enough to change the predisposing positioned stance on
the continuum of advocacy and accommodation (Pang et al., 2010). For example, the crisis
severity might be heightened or stakeholders might gain more salience, prompting the
organization to reevaluate its current stance (Coombs and Holladay, 2015), i.e. breaking the
silence prematurely and/or adopting a new response strategy.
Crisis response strategy. It is worth examining how an organization breaks its silence
through the type of response strategy employed. This might be part of the organization’s plan
prior to the adoption of silence, or the result of situational factors, such as when an
organization is compelled to break its silence due to pressure from stakeholders. According to
the SCCT (Coombs, 2008), ten common response strategies can be categorized into three
postures based on their communicative goals: deny (attack the accuser, denial and scapegoat),
diminish (excuse and justification) and deal (ingratiation, concern, compensation, regret and
apology). This study thus examines the circumstances surrounding the breaking of silence:
RQ3a. What leads the organization to break its silence?
RQ3b. How does the organization break the silence?
The effects of strategic silence
Since crisis management aims to “restore organizational normalcy and influence public
perception” (Pang, 2012, p. 359), the last research question assesses the overall effectiveness
of silence as a strategy by examining an organization’s post-silence image. This can be
analyzed along the four dimensions of organizational image as identified by Van Riel and
Fombrun (2007): product, social, financial and recruitment:
RQ4. How is an organization’s image affected after the silence is broken?
Method
Case studies are conducted to empirically investigate this “contemporary phenomenon
within some real-life context” (Yin, 1984, p. 13) to explore a “situation in which the
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 1993, as cited by
Pang et al., 2014, p. 104). Since prior research on intentional/strategic silence is limited, this
exploratory study employs the multiple-case study approach explained in Wan et al. (2015)
and Woon and Pang (2017), where detailed documentation of organizational and social
processes facilitate the answering of research questions. Case studies, as argued by Stake
(1998), explore the phenomenon the researcher is interested to explore, and the exploration
leads to the illumination of insights that contribute to theory building.
Case selection
Eight international crises where the organizations/leaders kept silent were identified with
the following criteria: it was evident that the silence was planned or intentional; cases were
sourced from different countries to provide diversity; and to lend currency and relevance,
they occurred within five years prior to the study (2012–2017). For full listing of the cases,
please see Table II.
Data collection
For each case, data were collected from news reports from Factiva and Google search; and
official content (press releases and other documents) published online by the organization/
leader involved. Sources were restricted to publications in English. In light of differing
cultural interpretations of silence, local news sources as well as international ones were
studied to examine the perceptions of various stakeholders. The duration was limited to a
day prior to news breaking of the crisis to two months after the silence-breaking point.
Please refer to Table III for data sources and duration.
Data analysis
This study employs Glaser and Strauss’ (1967) constant comparative approach to
inductively analyze data in four stages: comparing the incidents in each case; integrating the
categories; delimiting the theory; and writing the theory. First, data were examined on how
silence was adopted, sustained and broken. The cases were subsequently classified
according to the intended usage of silence, and whether the breaking of silence was forced
on or initiated by the organization/leader.
Next, the cases were analyzed based on the effects on organizational image during and
after the silence. This was determined along Van Riel and Fombrun’s (2007) four dimensions
of social image, financial image, product image and recruitment image.
Crisis descriptions (Year, country) Use of strategic silence (Organization/Leader)
Silence
duration
Violence broke out inMyanmar’s Rakhine State on
August 25, 2017, resulting in more than 100 deaths
and 400,000 mostly Rohingya refugees fleeing
Rakhine as of October 2017 (2017, Myanmar)
Myanmar’s de facto leader remained silent
on the issue for more than three weeks,
issuing her first public address on
September 19, 2017 (Leader 1)
3 weeks
Dire farming conditions caused growing suicide
rates in India yearly since 2005. From March to
April 2017, farmers from Tamil Nadu held
protests in New Delhi (2017, India)
Organization 1 stayed mute on the
situation for 40 days of the protest
and took no action (Organization 1)
40 days
April 2016 saw a massive coastal marine
pollution in four central provinces of Vietnam,
caused by Formosa Ha Tinh Steel’s illegal
discharge of 300 tons of toxic industrial waste
(2016, Vietnam)
Organization 2 attempted to protect
Formosa as a major foreign investor by
withholding information for nearly
three months (Organization 2)
3
months
Phones were found defective with overheating
issues in August 2016. Replacement devices also
caught fire or exploded, resulting in a global
recall (2016, International)
Initially, Organization 3 provided little
information. After the recall, it kept mostly silent
for 6.5 months after announcing intentions to
focus on investigations (Organization 3)
4
months
In April 2015, the nationwide issuance of
children’s vaccines was compromised when a
pharmacist was arrested for distributing
expired vaccines to healthcare agencies
across China (2015–2016, China)
Organization 4 chose to bury the scandal for
almost a year. The news was only made
known to the public on March 2016
(Organization 4)
1 year
Between April and June 2015, 25 patients
and seven deaths at Organization 5 were
linked to a hepatitis C virus within its
premises (2015, Singapore)
Organization 5 waited for four months
before announcing its suspicion of
the cause of infection (Organization 5)
4
months
On July 18, 2013, Organization 6 developer site
was hacked. The site was taken down and a
maintenance notice was put up. No further
information was shared until three days later
(2013, International)
Organization 6 remained silent while
working to resolve the issue. On July 21, 2013,
Organization 6 notified app developers of the
security breach and the corrective action taken
(Organization 6)
3 days
In September 2012, Organization 7 faced a
bacterial contamination in its meat-packing
plant, 10 cases of poisoning and a nationwide
tainted-beef recall (2012, Canada)
Organization 7 failed to offer an explanation or
address the issue publicly for three weeks after
the outbreak (Organization 7)
3 weeks
Table II.
Case descriptions
The information was then categorized into blocks of data representing what Glaser and
Strauss (1967) called “local” concepts (p. 45), such as the perceptions of stakeholders during
the silence or information vacuum, the circumstances leading to the breaking of silence, the
response strategies employed by the organization/leader to break the silence and the effects on
their image post-silence. With continuous comparisons of data in each category, additional
categories emerged. Links were then made between local concepts and categories, setting
boundaries for the theory. Finally, a theory explicating strategic silence was constructed.
Findings
The first research question examined an organization/leader’s adoption of silence as a crisis
management strategy by looking at the organizational intentions, crisis situation factors
and cultural context in which the organization operates.
Organizational intentions lead to different types of strategic silence used
Data showed that in all eight cases, silence was intentionally adopted by each organization/
leader with different agendas. Among the ten types of intentions proposed, three were
observed in the cases, namely, avoiding stakeholders/issues, hiding information and signaling
work-in-progress. From these intentions, the authors propose three new typologies of strategic
silence, respectively, avoiding silence, hiding silence and delaying silence (see Table IV). The
cases are categorized into three groups based on the type of silence used (see Table V).
Case Sources Duration of collection
Leader 1 News sources, e.g. The Guardian, CNN,
The Irrawaddy, New York Times
January 10, 2016–October 26, 2017
Organization 1 News sources, e.g. The Citizen, The Hindu,
International Business Times
April 13, 2017–September 18, 2017
Organization 2 News sources, e.g. Asia Times, Reuters,
New York Times, Channel News Asia
April 27, 2016–September 10, 2017
Organization 3 News sources, e.g. Forbes, Wall Street Journal,
Bloomberg, Reuters
Technology-focused news sites, e.g. Techspot, CNET
Official press releases on Samsung’s website
September 15, 2016–March 29, 2017
Organization 4 News sources, e.g. New York Times, Time Magazine,
The Straits Times, South China Morning Post
March 26, 2016–April 19, 2017
Organization 5 News sources, e.g. Channel News Asia,
The Straits Times, Today
October 6, 2015–March 17, 2016
Organization 6 News sites and sources, e.g. Macworld,
CNN, Huffington Post
July 21, 2013–July 22, 2013
Organization 7 News sources, e.g. Canadian Business,
The Globe and Mail, The Canadian Press
September 24, 2012–July 17, 2015
Table III.
Case news sources
and collection period
Silence function Organizational intention in crisis management
Linkage (+) Bond with stakeholders (−) Avoid stakeholders/issues
Avoiding silence
Affecting (+) Heal stakeholders (−) Wound stakeholders
Revelation (+) Reveal information (−) Hide information
Hiding silence
Judgment (+) Signal approval (−) Signal disapproval
Activation (+) Signal work-in-progress
Delaying silence
(−) Signal inaction
Table IV.
Proposed new
typologies for
strategic silence in
crisis management
Avoiding silence (Organizations 1 and 7). This type of strategic silence does the converse of
linkage ( Jensen, 1973), separating the organization from stakeholders and/or issues
concerning them. For instance, in India, Organization 1 deliberately kept silent to avoid
succumbing to farmers’ demands of agriculture loan waivers as it faced a shortage in the
state budget.
Hiding silence (Organizations 2 and 4). This type of strategic silence does the converse of
revelation ( Jensen, 1973), that is, to hide or withhold pertinent information from
stakeholders indefinitely. For instance, in Vietnam, Organization 2 kept silent for three
months, refusing to disclose an estimate of destruction to marine life and the number of
people falling ill, even withholding details of the toxic chemicals from victims and doctors,
citing the need to restrict coverage during investigation.
Delaying silence (Leader 1, Organizations 3, 5 and 6). This variant of strategic silence
signals activation ( Jensen, 1973). The intention is to communicate work-in-progress, with a
plan to break silence when sufficient information has been gathered and arrangements
made for a formal response. For instance, in Myanmar, in the statement which broke their
three-week silence, Leader 1 invited external observers to witness the problems first-hand in
Rakhine. This suggests that during the period of intentional silence, Leader 1 was
investigating the attacks and preparing for the logistics of the invitation.
Crisis management history might affect adoption of strategic silence
For each case, the study looks into whether crisis type, crisis responsibility, crisis severity
and the organization’s crisis history influenced the adoption of silence. Data showed that in
certain cases (Organizations 1, 4 and 6), if the organization had previously adopted silence to
deal with similar crises, it might do so again. For instance, with Organization 6, the company
had previously employed the same delaying silence approach when there were technical
issues with the antenna of a previous phone model, speaking up only after 22 days with a
press conference to provide updates and corrective action for phone users.
Cultural context might predispose the adoption of strategic silence
This was evident in China where the fear of criticism deeply embedded in Organization 4’s
culture may explain its tendency to obfuscate or withhold vital negative news, which is
consistent with the aforementioned theoretical suggestions (Hu and Pang, 2018; Pang, 2013;
Ye and Pang, 2011).
The second research question examined how did the organization’s silence intensify the
crisis, if it did. This question looks at the changes in relevant stakeholders’ perceptions of
the organization during the period of silence and the information vacuum generated in the
crisis. Based on the data, the effects of silence in the cases are categorized into four groups:
retrospective intensifier, intensifier in the information vacuum, polarizing perceptions and
minimal/no intensification, summarized in Table VI.
Location Organization/Leader Silence type
India Organization 1 Avoiding
Canada Organization 7 Avoiding
Vietnam Organization 2 Hiding
China Organization 4 Hiding
Myanmar Leader 1 Delaying
International Organization 3 Delaying
Singapore Organization 5 Delaying
International Organization 6 Delaying
Table V.
Case listing based on
type of silence used
Silence as a retrospective intensifier (Organizations 4 and 5)
In both cases, the public remained unaware of the crises until information came to light.
The organizations received retrospective criticism and were questioned on the delay in
revealing the news, with stakeholders forming negative perceptions of the silence after
news broke, intensifying the crisis. As such, there was no escalation of the information
vacuum/crisis during the actual silence period, only after. For instance, for Organization 5,
the public and opposition political parties questioned the delay in releasing information
and criticized the lack of transparency when investigation had started four months prior to
the news breaking.
Silence as an intensifier in the information vacuum (Organizations 1, 2, 3 and 7)
In these cases, after news of the crises broke, the silence contributed to and escalated the
information vacuum, and was perceived negatively by stakeholders, which aligns with
Woon and Pang’s (2017) theory. For instance, in India, Organization 1’s silent treatment and
indifference toward the farmers’ deaths and demands were heavily criticized by the media
and public, vehemently protested by farmers and reprimanded by the Supreme Court.
Silence producing polarizing perceptions (Leader 1)
While the above cases indicate that silence exacerbates the crisis, the situation is less
apparent with Myanmar. Leader 1’s reticence was perceived both positively and negatively
by different stakeholders. Generally portrayed in the international media as indifferent
toward ethnic cleansing, Leader 1 drew criticism from various foreign observers, including
fellow Nobel laureates. However, Leader 1 also received sympathy from foreign dignitaries,
such as Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, and
continued to enjoy unwavering support among their domestic audience, with hundreds of
supporters gathering for the September 19 address. Sympathetic observers justified
the silence as a result of Leader 1’s limited political purview over the Myanmar military,
which still held significant power. The ambiguity created by the silence might have been
strategically planned to give rise to “unchecked inference about one’s motives and actions”,
as theorized by Brummett (1980, pp. 293-294) in analyzing strategic silence in politics.
Silence having minimal/no intensification effect (Organization 6)
While Organization 6 was criticized by some developers and security experts for keeping
silent when it discovered the breach, there were also some who commended the organization
for acting quickly. Although there was an information vacuum, it was short-lived.
Organization 6’s swift action might have helped to contain the situation by preventing
further breaches and overreactions from stakeholders and the press. By the time app
developers were informed, the fix was already underway. A relatively short period of silence
(three days) may also be more justifiable and thus more acceptable to stakeholders.
Location Organization/Leader Silence type Effect of silence
China Organization 4 Hiding Intensified, retrospectively (−)
Singapore Organization 5 Delaying Intensified, retrospectively (−)
India Organization 1 Avoiding Intensified information vacuum (−)
Vietnam Organization 2 Hiding Intensified information vacuum (−)
International Organization 3 Delaying Intensified information vacuum (−)
Canada Organization 7 Avoiding Intensified information vacuum (−)
Myanmar Leader 1 Delaying Polarized perceptions (+/−)
International Organization 6 Delaying No effect (0)
Table VI.
Effects of silence
RQ3a examined what led the organization to break the silence. Data presented two
scenarios: when situational factors forced the organizations to break the avoiding/hiding
silence; and when the breaking of delaying silence went as planned. The breaking of silence
for each case is summarized in Table VII.
Silence broken due to situational factors (Organizations 1, 2, 4 and 7)
In the four cases of avoiding/hiding silence, various situational factors prompted
the organization to issue a response against its will. Such factors include one or
more intensified threats (litigation/publicity/legitimization of activist’s claim) or a change
in external public characteristics (size/power/commitment), which are situational factors
suggested in the contingency theory (Pang et al., 2010). In India, Organization 1 was forced
to break its silence after the farmers’ protests became wider and more extreme, drawing
support from opposition parties and trade bodies. The protesters had grown in size,
commitment and power, while their demands were legitimized following the Supreme
Court’s ruling. For Vietnam, after investigations affirmed Formosa’s involvement
and legitimized the activists’ claims, protests spread exponentially, forcing Organization 2
to acknowledge the issue as the worst environmental crisis in Vietnam’s history.
In China, the crisis was uncovered and publicized by two journalists, garnering national
attention in social and mainstream media, resulting in a sudden, intensified publicity
threat that prompted Organization 4 to respond. For Organization 7, the investigation
confirmed its responsibility, thereby legitimizing the challenge and intensifying
the publicity threat, forcing Organization 7 to issue a long-awaited news release on
October 4, 2012.
Silence broken as planned (Leader 1, Organizations 3, 5 and 6)
In the four cases of delaying silence as part of a broader plan, it was observed that changes
in stakeholders’ salience, if any, were not significant enough and the threats to reputation
were not intensified enough to force the silence to be broken earlier than intended.
Additionally, preparatory work must be completed in the form of investigative work such
that sufficient information is obtained, and the organization/leader is able to form a primary
response. With Myanmar, criticisms of Leader 1 were aligned with those previously
received on their past track record of treating the Muslim community. Hence, although the
crisis severity escalated as hundreds of thousands of Muslims fled the country with
increasing media coverage, Leader 1 consistently maintained their stance on the issue. It can
then be inferred that the September 19 speech was the result of deliberate planning.
For Organization 3, the management used the duration of silence to gather information and
take preparatory actions that would satisfy its stakeholders and provide closure.
On January 23, 2017, a statement was issued regarding the cause of the fault and future
quality enhancement plans. The timing seemed well planned to allow for two months to
Location Organization/Leader Silence Breaking of silence
India Organization 1 Avoiding Forcefully broken by situational factors
Canada Organization 7 Avoiding Forcefully broken by situational factors
Vietnam Organization 2 Hiding Forcefully broken by situational factors
China Organization 4 Hiding Forcefully broken by situational factors
Myanmar Leader 1 Delaying Broken as planned
International Organization 3 Delaying Broken as planned
Singapore Organization 5 Delaying Broken as planned
International Organization 6 Delaying Broken as planned
Table VII.
Breaking of silence

social image, financial image, product image and recruitment image (Van Riel
and Fombrun, 2007) post-silence. Table VIII summarizes the effects of the organization’s
post-silence image.
Where avoiding/hiding silence is broken forcefully (Organizations 1, 2, 4 and 7)
In all four cases, organizational image was negatively affected after the breaking of silence.
For instance, with India, the country was left in shock as the media continued to cover the
farmers’ struggles and emphasized Organization 1’s inaction despite the court’s ruling,
signifying a damaged social image for Organization 1. In the Vietnam case, Organization 2’s
restriction on press coverage of the pollution crisis drew attention to the lack of press
freedom in the country and caused increasing unease over both pollution and food safety.
Even a year post-silence, anger is still brewing among Vietnamese fishermen for the
organization’s poor disaster handling, affecting their livelihoods in the repercussion.
Political Science Professor Tuong Vu remarked that the case showed its incompetency and
corruption, resulting in lasting damage on its social image.
Where delaying silence is broken as planned (Leader 1, Organizations 3, 5 and 6)
In all four cases, those involved were mostly able to preserve or restore their post-silence
image. For instance, with pre-order sales for its new phone models surpassing previous
phones, Organization 3 appeared to have restored consumer confidence in its products,
i.e. preserving its product image. Media reports following January 23’s press conference also
suggested that consumers and investors had moved on as the conglomerate continued to
perform well in the market, i.e. restoring its financial image.
Discussion
New typologies for strategic silence
Out of the ten possible organizational intentions listed in Table I, the study observed three in
our cases and proposed three corresponding typologies (in Table V ):
(1) avoiding silence is used when the organization/leader intends to avoid certain
stakeholder and/or issues at hand;
(2) hiding silence is used to hide relevant information from stakeholders; and
(3) delaying silence is employed to signal work-in-progress and buy time for a primary
response.
The findings show that when avoiding/hiding silence is used but broken forcefully, it
produces a negative effect on stakeholders’ perceptions of the organization both during the
information vacuum and post-silence. However, when delaying silence is used, it can be
tolerated by certain stakeholders during the silence itself. The right time to break delaying
Location Organization/Leader Silence Post-silence organizational image
India Organization 1 Avoiding Damaged (social)
Canada Organization 7 Avoiding Ruined (social, product, financial and recruitment)
Vietnam Organization 2 Hiding Damaged (social)
China Organization 4 Hiding Damaged (social)
Myanmar Leader 1 Delaying Retained local support (social)
International Organization 3 Delaying Recovered (product and financial)
Singapore Organization 5 Delaying Recovered (product)
International Organization 6 Delaying Recovered (product and financial)
Table VIII.
Effects of
organizational
image post-silence
silence is when the organization has gathered enough information or is sufficiently prepared
for the intended crisis response strategy. If the organization manages to break the delaying
silence with an appropriate response strategy as planned, stakeholders are more likely to
maintain/regain confidence in the organization.
Delaying silence can be part of an effective crisis management strategy
The findings challenge the dominant view that in times of crisis, organizations should
always issue a response as quickly as possible, or “steal thunder” from the public or media.
Under certain circumstances, silence can be golden, if employed strategically and
implemented carefully. Among the eight cases, delaying silence has potential to work in the
organization/leader’s favor, by presenting five advantages:
(1) When used to signal work-in-progress, delaying silence may be more tolerable
toward stakeholders and could reduce intensification of the crisis.
(2) Together with constant monitoring of threats and changes to stakeholder salience,
delaying silence may be able to withstand the pressures of such situational factors.
(3) Intentionally employing delaying silence would put the organization in a proactive
position as they would determine the breaking of silence, thus giving them control
over the crisis.
(4) Delaying silence can also be used to provide the organization with additional time to
conduct further investigation before issuing a primary response.
(5) If implemented well, delaying silence has shown to have a possibility of image
recovery for the organization.
Delaying silence can thus prove positive if employed to signal activation and sustained long
enough for an appropriate primary response to be crafted and issued.
The advantages of issuing a first-response statement before delaying silence
Since delaying silence is used to signal work-in-progress, it is worth exploring whether a
first-response statement should be issued pre-silence, especially when the crisis cause is
unclear, as seen in the cases of Organizations 3, 5 and 6. Smith (2013) suggested that
strategic silence may work better with a statement of justification. This paper defines a
first-response statement as a disclaimer to signal work-in-progress before delaying silence,
without stating a definite stance. Coombs (2015b) argued that organizations can create
holding statements or templates. Templates are “prewritten messages that require only a
few blanks to be filled before they are released” (p. 97). These may lack details but they
provide some early information. Some of these early information include core messages that
have been written and approved before the crisis. These templates need to be clearly
distinguished from a primary response issued only after proper investigation to break
silence. Issuing a first-response statement immediately before adopting delaying silence can
present a number of benefits:
(1) It helps the organization avoid being criticized should they stay completely silent
before issuing a primary response, which might be interpreted as withholding
information, assuming guilt or expressing lack of sympathy, particularly when
crisis severity is high or might escalate. For Organization 5, one question to consider
is whether retrospective criticism could be avoided if it had offered a first-response
statement. The public were not informed during the investigation as alerting them to
a potentially life-threatening problem prematurely could have triggered panic, so the
prudence of Organization 5 in this case might be justified.
(2) It frees up the risk of having to adopt a stance prematurely before the organization is
ready to commit to one. For Organization 3, the management had mistakenly
assured customers of the safety of the devices after the first recall and eventually
had to launch a second recall. An analyst suggested that Organization 3 should have
made a less conclusive first-response statement at the onset of the crisis to buy time
for the organization, while assuring stakeholders that it is attending to the situation.
(3) It helps the organization to focus on fixing the issue without any external
distractions (Smith, 2013).
(4) It gives allowance to gather accurate information for a proper, primary response.
There is a need to weigh the benefits of issuing a first-response statement to avoid
accusations of being non-transparent (Organization 5) against the risks of giving incomplete
and possibly inaccurate information (Organization 3). If the organization is confident that
the investigation can be done expeditiously, there may not be a need for a first-response
statement (Organization 6).
Practical guide to delaying silence
Incorporating the points discussed above, this study proposes a four-stage managerial
guide on when to adopt delaying silence, as well as how to plan, sustain and break delaying
silence (see Figure 1).
When to adopt delaying silence. Delaying silence can be used when the organization needs
time to investigate the crisis, especially when the cause is unclear; to fix an issue with a clear
cause without inciting panic; or to gather information or make arrangements for a primary
response. In such cases, delaying silence can be used as a supporting strategy to prepare for
a primary response.
Planning silence. Once the crisis hits, the organization should begin to formulate a
primary response strategy following Coombs’ (2008) SCCT framework. The local context
should be assessed, e.g. whether silence may be perceived by local stakeholders the same
way the organization intends. Finally, depending on how confident the organization is in
obtaining the necessary information swiftly, it might opt to issue a first-response statement
to signal work-in-progress.
Sustaining silence. During the silence, while working on investigating and fixing the issue
and preparing for the issuance of the primary response (and related logistics), the
organization needs to continuously monitor threats and stakeholder salience to detect any
intensification. It is key to have appropriate contingency responses planned in case there is a
need to prematurely break the silence.
Breaking silence. If all goes according to plan, the organization issues the primary response(s)
as intended once it has obtained sufficient information and made adequate preparation.
Adopting Silence?
(Start of crisis)
• Time is needed to
  investigate the crisis
• Time is needed to fix
  the issue
• Information needed to
  be gathered to prepare
  for primary response
• Assess crisis situation
• Assess predisposing
  factors
• Formulate primary
  response strategy
• Issue first-response
  statement to signal
  delay
• Obtain information
• Prepare for primary
  response
• Monitor threats
• Monitor stakeholder
  salience
• Prepare contingency
  responses
• Issue primary
  response as planned
• Monitor stakeholder
  perception
Planning Silence Sustaining Silence Breaking Silence
Figure 1.
“Guide to delaying
silence” flowchart
It is also important to monitor stakeholders’ perceptions of the response to detect if the
organizational image – be it social, financial, product and/or recruitment image (Van Riel and
Fombrun, 2007) – has been negatively affected, and to come up with appropriate follow-up
image repair measures.
Limitations
There are certain limitations to the study. First, these findings may lack generalizability due
to the limited number of cases studied. Second, local sentiments may not be fully
represented in the English-language news examined as they may be written for a different
audience, e.g. the expatriate community. Finally, a number of cases (Leader 1, Organization 1)
were still ongoing at the time of writing, so the overall effectiveness of the strategy
employed might be compromised as future events unfold.
The cases selected involved both political and organizational crises. A larger set of cases
would help to determine if there are differences in the use of silence in these two crisis
contexts. It is envisaged that silence might be used more often or for different reasons
depending on it being a political or organizational context. Future research could examine a
wider selection of cases to complete the typology of strategic silence based on the five
communicative functions discussed, and investigate instances where strategic silence might
be effective as a primary or solo strategy itself. Empirical studies could also be conducted to
investigate the mediating power of delaying silence on the relationship between the primary
response strategy type and stakeholder perceptions.
Conclusion
Crisis management strives to merge theory with practice (Heath and Coombs, 2006).
However, crisis theory often trails behind practice (Coombs, 2015a), and the study of silence
as a crisis management strategy is a case in point. This paper has attempted to explore the
practice of strategic silence, “elevating it from discretional reaction to complex pro-action”
as Dimitrov (2015, p. 648) suggested, and aims to fill the theoretical gap by offering clearer
intention-based definitions of strategic silence and a practical guide on when and how
strategic silence can be used to manage crises. As Coombs (2008) and Pang (2012) noted,
theory must be carefully developed and rigorously tested over time. The propositions of this
paper remain to be tested in future work, and it is hoped that new avenues of research have
been identified through this investigation.
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